Towards a Cyber-physical Resilience Framework for Smart Grids by Friedberg, Ivo et al.
Towards a Cyber-physical Resilience Framework for Smart Grids
Friedberg, I., McLaughlin, K., & Smith, P. (2015). Towards a Cyber-physical Resilience Framework for Smart
Grids. In S. Latre, M. Charalambrides, J. Francois, C. Schmitt, & B. Stiller (Eds.), Intelligent Mechanisms for
Network Configuration and Security: 9th IFIP WG 6.6 International Conference on Autonomous Infrastructure,
Management, and Security, AIMS 2015, Ghent, Belgium, June 22-25, 2015. Proceedings. (pp. 140-144).
(Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9122). Springer. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-20034-7_15
Published in:
Intelligent Mechanisms for Network Configuration and Security
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
 © 2015 International Federation for Information Processing 2015. Published by Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg. All Rights
Reserved.
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal
Towards a Cyber-physical Resilience Framework for Smart Grids
Friedberg, I., McLaughlin, K., & Smith, P. (2015). Towards a Cyber-physical Resilience Framework for Smart
Grids. 140-144. Paper presented at 9th International Conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management
and Security (AIMS 2015), Belgium.10.1007/978-3-319-20034-7_15
Document Version:
Author final version (often known as postprint)
Link:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright © International Federation for Information Processing 2015. Published by Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg
YEAR. All Rights Reserved.
Embargo: 12 months
Must include a link to the published article on-line.
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Sep. 2015
Towards a Cyber-physical Resilience Framework
for Smart Grids
Ivo Friedberg1,2, Kieran McLaughlin1, and Paul Smith2
1 Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK
{ifriedberg01, kieran.mclaughlin}@qub.ac.uk
2 AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Vienna, Austria
firstname.lastname@ait.ac.at
Abstract. As modern power grids move towards becoming a smart grid,
there is an increasing reliance on the data that is transmitted and pro-
cessed by ICT systems. This reliance introduces new digital attack vec-
tors. Many of the proposed approaches that aim to address this problem
largely focus on applying well-known ICT security solutions. However,
what is needed are approaches that meet the complex concerns of the
smart grid as a cyber-physical system. Furthermore, to support the au-
tomatic control loops that exist in a power grid, similarly automatic
security and resilience mechanisms are needed that rely on minimal op-
erator intervention. The research proposed in this paper aims to develop
a framework that ensures resilient smart grid operation in light of suc-
cessful cyber-attacks.
1 Introduction
Power systems are one of the most critical infrastructures in our society. Priority
lies on the stable operation of any power system, ensuring (i) human safety, (ii)
availability and (iii) equipment safety [10]. With the shift towards distributed,
renewable energy sources, extensive use is made of information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) infrastructures, to enable novel control strategies and
energy services. Embedded systems that once worked independently in the power
grid, are now operated interconnected as a smart grid. But systems where ICT
components control the operation of physical entities – so called cyber-physical
systems – such as smart grids, get increasingly targeted by sophisticated cyber-
attacks [4]. Thus, to provide resilience – the ability to maintain acceptable op-
eration in the face of faults and challenges [5] – during successful cyber-attacks
on smart grids is an operation critical problem.
This cyber-physical nature of the smart grid introduces a range of new chal-
lenges when ensuring grid stability in light of cyber-attacks. One especially hard
problem lies in managing both the physical (power) system and the cyber sys-
tem, in order to provide a comprehensive resilience strategy. Without addressing
this problem it is not possible to effectively address the risks caused by the in-
terdependency between both systems. However, current research in the area is
largely focused on either ensuring the robustness of control loops for the physical
power system (e.g., [9]) or securing the ICT systems. Efforts to secure the ICT
systems in this domain largely focus on the prevention [8] or detection [12, 3]
of cyber-attacks – limited attention is paid to what steps should be taken to
ensure grid stability when an attack is successful. In ICT systems, this prob-
lem is often left to be solved by human operators. The control loops in power
grids – e.g., the Automatic Generation Control (AGC) in Energy Management
Systems (EMSs) – currently issue control commands on the order of seconds [6].
This makes timely manual intervention by human operators quite difficult, if not
impossible.
In related work, an integrated security framework for power grids is pro-
posed [7]. The authors highlight operational blocks of the framework, but the
interaction between these blocks is not clearly defined. A data model is needed
that tailors the framework to a concrete infrastructure. Furthermore, the authors
limit the analysis of the monitored data to anomaly detection. This approach
is limiting because current power systems and ICT systems have well-known
(non-anomaly based) security and detection mechanisms in place. Sridhar and
Manimaran propose an automatic attack mitigation approach that addresses
attacks on the AGC control loop [6]. While the described attack scenario lever-
ages the cyber-physical design of the system under evaluation, the mitigation
approach operates only on measurement data from the physical part of the sys-
tem. Furthermore, a broader approach is needed to extend resilient operation to
different control loops.
In this paper, we propose a novel cyber-physical resilience framework for
smart grids. The framework aims to ensure acceptable levels of grid operation,
even in the case of successful and targeted cyber-attacks. The novelty of our
work lies in the inclusion of attack detection approaches from the cyber and
physical systems of a smart grid. Therefore, our focus lies on the mitigation
of the negative effects of cyber-attacks on physical system components or their
control loops to ensure stable grid operation.
2 Proposed Research: A Cyber-physical Resilience
Framework
Our cyber-physical resilience framework consists of a system model and a re-
silience control loop. The system model has two main parts: (i) a generic system
model that is provided with the framework; and (ii) a specific system model that
has to be derived from the generic model when the framework is applied to a
target infrastructure. The purpose of the model is to describe the necessary do-
main knowledge to realise the framework and to define the data structures that
are transferred between the functional blocks that realise the control loop. The
development of the generic model will be one major challenge for this research.
The operation of the grid is managed by the resilience control loop, which is
depicted in Fig. 1. It interacts with both the ICT and physical systems of a smart
grid to detect and mitigate cyber-attacks. Its functionality can be described as
follows. Both the physical and ICT systems of the Grid will be monitored using
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Fig. 1. The control loop at the center of our resilience framework. Rectangular blocks
indicate the functional blocks in the loop, while ellipses (transferred data) and hexagons
(domain knowledge) mark where parts of the system model will be used.
various systems. For example, for the ICT systems, existing security solutions
will be used such as intrusion detection systems. Meanwhile, for the physical
systems various parameters (e.g., voltage, active and reactive power, frequency
or phase) will be monitored. Additionally, existing security algorithms in the
EMS (e.g., state estimation or bad data detection) [11] can be used to trig-
ger alerts in the case of unexpected behaviour. We foresee one of the major
challenges is choosing the right monitoring techniques at the different points of
the cyber-physical system. This monitoring needs to be extensive, in order to
get a comprehensive view of the whole cyber-physical system, but as limited as
possible to make real time correlation feasible.
All System Monitoring Data is transferred to the Alert Correlation function.
Additional information about operational metrics is provided from a dynamically
configurable Reference. The reference data is used to understand the status of
the power system based on the collected physical measurements. It contains set
points as well as optimal, acceptable and critical operational areas for the various
physical measurements. In the Alert Correlation function, information provided
from both parts of the cyber-physical system is analyzed and correlated. The
result of this phase is a set of alerts. An alert in this context is a signal that
indicates a deviation from optimal system behaviour. The set of possible alerts
is defined in the system model. The main challenges associated with realising
the Alert Correlation function include determining the correct interpretation
of physical measurement values during the course of operation, and the timely
correlation of monitoring data from the ICT domain and physical domain.
The Effect Prediction functionality processes the correlated alerts and pre-
dicts the operational behaviour of the grid to detect potentially critical devel-
opments, so called effects. An effect is seen as a critical operational state that,
if reached, would violate the definition of resilient operation, as defined by the
Reference. Here we see the major challenge to be the development of an algo-
rithm that estimates the future state of the grid, based on the alerts triggered
by the current system state.
Finally, the predicted effects are transmitted to the Countermeasure Decision
function. Here the available countermeasures are evaluated based on the set of
predicted system effects. A decision is taken on which countermeasures to apply.
Arguably, for resilient operation it is not required to tackle the root cause of a
problem. It can be a valid strategy to do so, but often the root cause cannot be
automatically detected or eliminated. Rather, the highest priority of the applied
countermeasures (to both the cyber and physical systems) is to mitigate the
imminent threat to stable system operation. One challenge will be to identify
applicable and effective countermeasures in each domain. Furthermore, applying
an automatic countermeasure could result in the non-optimal operation of the
grid. Therefore, the decision needs to aim for the least limiting countermeasure
that is sufficient to mitigate the effect.
3 Research Methodology
We propose to take a practical approach to evaluating the resilience frame-
work. A test setup, including a power generator and a Phasor Measurement
Unit (PMU), will be developed, based on the work of Best et al. [2]. The goal
will be to detect a set of attacks on a synchronized, but islanded generator. The
effects of such attacks can range from outages in the island to equipment damage
when the generator is reconnected to the mains supply whilst not synchronized.
Countermeasures will be developed to automatically mitigate these risks. To en-
sure that the lab experiments are representative for attacks in the wild, they will
be based on officially published threat scenarios (e.g. the Electric Sector Failure
Scenarios and Impact Analyses by NESCOR [1]) and performed with modern
protocols like IEC 61850. Measuring the effectiveness of the proposed framework
will be performed in two ways. Physical (e.g., phase, current or frequency) and
operational metrics (e.g. thresholds or set-points) will be used to evaluate the
timely effectiveness of the framework in countering the critical effects of success-
ful cyber-attacks. Second, we will develop experimental scenarios that will allow
us to compare our framework to related work, such as that discussed earlier.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued for the need for a cyber-physical resilience frame-
work for smart grids, and presented our initial findings for developing such a
framework. The expected impact of this research is an increased resilience of fu-
ture power systems against cyber-attacks. This resilience is needed to successfully
realize the vision of a smart grid. Without it, smart grids will either be realized
in a limited way, or the increased use of ICT technology in the power domain will
open the means for cyber-attacks with significant societal impact. From a sci-
entific point of view, this research aims to make new advances in cyber-physical
system resilience. Results of this research could be extended to address emerging
threats or applied to other application domains of cyber-physical systems.
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